|
Home
About
Us
Media
Priorities
Publications
Education
Students
Service
Guide
Contact
Us
|
I worked for the Physical
Disability Council of NSW (PDCN) through the whole
of the Ageing and Disability Department (ADD)
debacle (there is no other word for it) of 2000 /
2001.
The opportunity given to us
by the NCOSS conference on Advocacy to reflect, to
use hindsight, to see what we have learned and to
move on is welcome.
But one does have to note
strongly that we have moved on.
- ADD no longer exists. I
believe that DADHC, although not problem-free,
provides a more coherent structure with which we
can engage.
- Personnel changes make
DADHC a different organism to ADD. In short, I
simple do not believe that the Director General
who stopped the destructive and badly managed
process would have allowed it to
commence.
- We have a new Minister
with a clear strategic vision for disability
policy around which we can have meaningful
debate.
- The disability advocacy
and information services sectors have changed
(and that tendency to change is about the only
constant here). I contend also that:
- we have
matured,
- we are
smarter,
- we are more committed to
genuine and open collaborations and
that
- we are, as a consequence,
stronger and more effective.
As far as PDCN is concerned,
it is more useful to learn from the past than to
dwell in it. Here are some key points that we
learned.
The ADD EOI
misadventure
- It began for us, like
everyone in the sector, with the letter from ADD
Director General, Marianne Hammerton, dated 10th
January 2001.
- We know, of course, that
it must have and did start inside ADD much
earlier: at least 6 months earlier.
- In an internal NSW Ageing
and Disability Department paper dated 30th June
2000 and entitled Improving Outcomes in
Disability Advocacy / Information Services
(never published, never acknowledged to exist by
its author and … as if we were in a spy
movie or something … leaked to me), it was
asserted:
- "ADD will lead a project
to improve advocacy / information outcomes
through a policy framework, performance
management improvements, and an industry
development strategy." (Page 2)
"The Project (sic) will
engage a contestable funding process as a driver
for clarifying and improving service delivery.
All existing providers, as well as any new
services, will be encouraged to compete for the
provision of advocacy / information services."
(Page 3)
"Implementation
Milestones"
- Appoint
….
- Communication Strategy to
take effect from July 2000 ….
- EOI Process concludes by
end January 2001." (Page 7)
- We all heaved a heavy
sigh of relief when, on 20th September 2001, the
third DG in nine months of what used to be ADD
and is now DADHC, Margaret Allison,
wrote"
- "As a result of advice I
have provided to the Minister, she has agreed
that the current EOI is to be stopped, with a
new process to be commenced in the near
future."
So why did the great
misadventure take place?
I've no idea why it took
place at that time and in the appallingly badly
handled way that it turned out. Here's some
educated guess work.
- The Commonwealth's review
of advocacy services probably lead State
Government officials and departmental staff to
believe that something ought to be done about
advocacy in NSW. I believe the initial thinking
(or lack of it) was not much more detailed or
coherent than that.
- The Minister's Office at
the time (probably) did believe that there
existed a need to create more individual
advocacy services. This is a view that the
disability advocacy sector in NSW had been
promoting for some time so it's not surprising
that a Minister's Office would pick up on
it.
- The Minister's Office and
ADD apparently believed that the balance between
individual advocacy and systemic advocacy was
not right in NSW.
- Mid-term was the right
political time to embark on "The Project" from
the Minister's Office and ADD perspectives. The
exercise would probably not be problem free, so
they wanted to make sure it was done and dusted
well before the 2003 State Election.
- Competitive tendering
through an EOI was held to be a sound mechanism
for purchasing services. And it was, in part, to
be the purchasing side of the 'purchaser /
provider' split, that ADD had been
created.
I believe this to be a
fundamentally flawed policy hangover from the 1990s
(actually from the detestable Thatcher Project).
Fortunately, competitive tendering in the field of
human services planning has been thoroughly
discredited. While Governments can probably create
better, cheaper roads and bridges through such
purchasing regimes, human services can't be bought
and sold in the same way. It was a policy mistake
compounded by implementation failures of,
sometimes, breath-taking incompetence.
What happened?
- ADD developed the project
internally without sufficient thought or
analysis and no attempt to engage the sector
until after an implementation plan had been
publicly announced (i.e. only after they had
reached a point of no return).
- The Minister of the day
received and acted upon poor advice.
- The project was poorly
managed and badly presented.
- Rightly, disability
advocacy and information services became
defensive, organised, active and effective, all
which are, as anyone could have told them,
elements of our core business.
- The political shit hit
the fan as evidenced by:
- Questions to Minsters in
both Houses.
- Motions in both
Houses
- An Upper House
Inquiry
- TV, Radio and newsprint
coverage that did not diminish with
time
- Literally thousands of
letters to and from politicians of all
parties
- … and all the rest
that flowed from us doing our advocacy job
well.
- The EOI process was
extended at the very point of the deadline for
submissions.
- Heads rolled.
- ADD vanished (for reasons
other than this mess).
- The process was
stopped.
What didn't
happen?
- The quality of life of
people with disability was in no way enhanced by
the original EOI process. It never could have
been. Improving that quality of life was
supposed to be, in part, why ADD existed. The
Department wasted public money, its time and our
energy on a pointless, ill-conceived, badly
implemented strategy that was doomed to fail
from the outset.
- I have never seen
evidence to support the claim, nor do I believe,
that part of the initial motivation of the
project launched on 10th January 2001 (six
months late) was to 'get even with' or 'destroy'
individuals or organisations in the advocacy
sector. Why not, Dougie?
- No individual in the
sector is that important or threatening, no
matter how much we might want to believe that we
could be.
- There were much easier
and quieter ways to reduce funding to or cut
specific organisations.
- The 'get even' theory
relies on an analysis of modern Government and
departmental behaviour that is simply not
consistent with the real world in the 21st
Century. It turns a debate around ideas and
policies into something more like a schoolyard
personality clash. While I do not doubt for a
moment that some of the protagonists will not be
sending one another Christmas cards, I feel that
the 'get even with' or 'payback' theory was not
a motivating factor and misses the
political point.
What did I learn or
experience again?
About
Government
- Sometimes governments
make unwise policy decisions based on bad
advice.
- Sometimes departmental
officials implement unwise policies (which
they may have poorly advised government to
pursue) very, very badly.
- Even though a policy
is stupidity on a stick and it is very badly
implemented, governments are also party
machines and, even when advised poorly,
sometimes seek to defend the
indefensible.
- That it is unlikely
that any government will make such a bad
mistake with such a poor policy again. It was
a bad enough process to be almost
unrepeatable.
- That it sometimes
takes a new person inside to say, look this
just has to stop.
- It can move
on.
About the
sector
- We work best when we
work together.
- That strategies
devised by groups of well-informed,
enthusiastic and active participants have
more chance of success than working it out by
one's self.
- Involvement and
participation of all legitimate stakeholders
are positive.
- A shared purpose is
vital.
- Transparency of debate
and decision-making is essential.
- Hard work gets
results.
- It's easier (even
though this was hard) when the policy is so
patently stupid, which means, of course, it
could have been a lot harder.
- Alliance building is
essential.
- Sometimes we can not
lose (no one won here).
- We can move
on.
About
me
- I don't want to go
through it again but I will if I'm forced to:
It's what I do.
- I've moved
on.
Dougie Herd
PDCN Executive Officer
4th April 2003
|
